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Laudatory Terms in Trademark Law:  
Square Pegs in Round Holes 
Gary J. Sosinsky* 
INTRODUCTION 
American society just might have a fetish for being the best.  
At any sporting event, one would be hard pressed to hear the chant 
“We’re Number Two!”  Leaders of companies often say they de-
sire to make their company the best in their field.1  The Super 
Bowl champion visits the White House after the season ends.  The 
runner-up simply goes home.  Many American car companies 
compare their cars to a Mercedes, the alleged top car company in 
the world, or at least one car many consumers dream of having.  At 
high school graduations, the valedictorian speaks to the graduates, 
their friends and family.  As for the salutatorian, it’s a nice try and 
a ceremony with her mouth shut.  It is not a far stretch to say then, 
that Americans try to associate themselves with “the best.”  
American industry is all too conscious of this fact, and American 
companies often coin their products with terms associated with be-
ing the best.  This is where our trouble starts.  Can one company 
monopolize the right to label its product in a way that connotes it is 
the finest product on the market? 
Arguably, trademark law is woven into the fabric of our coun-
try’s economics.  Companies such as McDonalds, Nike, Microsoft 
and Intel are money-making machines.  However, when these 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University School of Law; Masters of Public and 
Private Management, Yale University School of Management, 1996.  I would like to 
thank my family for a lifetime of love and support. 
1. The odd exception to this is Avis Rent-A-Car, which makes a big deal as being 
smaller and more hard-working than the industry leader, Hertz.  Avis’s “We Try Harder” 
slogan (whether true or not) has made its mark in the marketplace. 
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companies were first established, no one could have predicted the 
success that each of these entities would enjoy.  Where once, each 
of these company names meant very little, now these corporations 
and their trademarks stand for something very special—a huge 
corporate empire with the money and goodwill that go along with 
it.  The goal of trademark law is to protect the public, the compa-
nies that have created the trademark, and the associated goodwill 
that goes hand in hand with the trademark.2  In addition, it has 
been stated that trademarks render four functions deserving of 
court protection: 
(1) identifying one producer’s goods and distinguishing 
them from the goods of others; 
(2) signifying that all goods bearing the trademark come 
from or are controlled by a single source; 
(3) signifying that all products containing the mark are of 
equal quality; and 
(4) helping a producer in advertising and selling the goods.3 
The companies mentioned above as well as much smaller busi-
nesses have utilized trademark law to make the purchasing public 
aware of what is theirs and what is not.  As was implied earlier, 
trademarks, used properly, are statements of quality.4  By linking 
their products to a certain level of quality, companies position their 
 
2. S. REP. NO. 1333  (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (cited in DONALD 
A. GREGORY, ET. AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 84-85 (1994) (ci-
tation omitted)).  When the Senate Committee reported out the bill that was to become 
the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act), it noted that trademark law had 
two purposes: 
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product 
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product 
which it asks for and wants to get.  Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark 
has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is 
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.  
This is the well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-
mark owner. 
Id. 
3. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 3:2 (4th ed. 1996). 
4. See JOHN D. OATHOUT, TRADEMARKS 34 (1981). 
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products and stimulate sales, boosting the economy. 
Both the public and producers of goods benefit from trademark 
law.  The public benefits because its “search costs” are lessened 
and the companies benefit because each one knows that if a par-
ticular consumer wishes to purchase its good or service, the con-
sumer will not have to sift through different products that are very 
similarly named in order to find the one that he or she is looking 
for.5  The company earns income that helps its bottom line and the 
consumer spends her hard-earned money on a product or service 
that should satisfy her needs. 
Though registration of a trademark is not necessary to protect a 
mark from others using it as their own, it is recommended to do 
so.6  Trademark rights live forever as long as the holder of the 
mark neither abandons the mark nor permits it to lose its trademark 
significance by becoming a generic term.7  When protection lasts 
 
5. Customers look for specific brands because of the qualities associated with that 
brand.  See id.; see also Union Nat’ Bank of Texas, Laredo, Texas, v. Union Nat’ Bank of 
Texas, Austin, Texas, 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining the value of trade-
marks in reducing consumer search costs); William Landes & Richard Posner, Trade-
mark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987) (discussing 
the economic benefits of a brand name). 
6. It is recommended to establish your rights by applying to register the mark in the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office even before use.  See Kenneth B. Germain, Scratching 
the Surface of Trademark Law, C602 ALI-ABA 6 (1991).  A company can base its appli-
cation to register a mark on one of a few premises: (a) a bona fide intention to use the 
mark in federally regulated commerce (the mark then must be used in the ordinary course 
of business); (b) a foreign owner’s country of origin application filed during the previous 
six months, or its country of origin registration, in either case with a statement of a bona 
fide intention to use the mark in the course of business; or (c) actual use of the mark in 
commerce. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (West 1998). 
7. See generally Silverman v. CBS Inc. 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 492 
U.S. 907 (1989) (for a discussion of abandonment of trademarks); see also Star-Kist 
Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhoades & Co., 769 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that a trade-
mark was not abandoned when the owner of the mark ceased using the mark for a period 
of unprofitability but intended to use the mark again when the economics were more fa-
vorable).  For a discussion of generic terms, see generally DuPont Cellophane Co. v. 
Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) (holding that whether a trademark has been 
abandoned includes whether the mark has been voluntarily surrendered to the public); see 
also King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc. 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(holding that the term THERMOS was generic and not entitled to federal trademark pro-
tection when the great majority of the American public referred to any vacuum-insulated 
container as a thermos). 
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forever, it is not difficult to see why coining a “proper” trademark 
is important to any business. 
In 1997, Estee Lauder brought an action against the Gap, 
claiming that the Gap’s use of the term “100%” on its body lotion 
packaging would cause consumers confusion because the term 
“100%” was similar to Estee Lauder’s use of the term “100%” on 
its body lotion packaging.8  The Second Circuit held that the term 
“100%” was “suggestive” and worthy of protection as long as con-
sumers would be confused by the two different brands, a finding 
that Estee Lauder could not prove.9  The most interesting part of 
the case was the court’s discussion of whether or not the term 
“100%” could be protected as a trademark.10  The issue was 
whether “100%” was deemed “suggestive” or “descriptive.”  If 
suggestive, the term could be protected, but if descriptive, the term 
could not be protected absent a showing of secondary meaning.11  
The court stated the term “100%” was a laudatory one, such as 
“Best,” “Plus,” or “Super” in that it appears to praise any product it 
is associated with, just as “Best” would do the same.12  The Estee 
Lauder case demonstrated that coping with the protection of lauda-
tory terms is a challenging task. 
Generally, it has been held that laudatory terms are descriptive 
and therefore not protected without a showing of secondary mean-
ing.13  Therefore, the Estee Lauder case, by holding “100%” sug-
gestive, re-kindled an old dilemma in trademark law.  Whether a 
term is labeled suggestive or descriptive is critical for the company 
trying to register or protect the term because showing that a term 
has secondary meaning, as is necessary for descriptive terms, is a 
difficult burden.14  For laudatory terms, there appears no easy an-
swer. 
This Note argues that laudatory terms have been mislabeled as 
 
8. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997). 
9. See id. at 1512. 
10. See id. at 1509-10. 
11. See id.; see also supra Part I. 
12. See 108 F.3d at 1509. 
13. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17. (stating the prevailing view). 
14. See, e.g., Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 927-28 (2d Cir. 
1991) (discussing that there is no specific formula for determining secondary meaning). 
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descriptive for many years, when in fact they are actually more 
akin to suggestive terms.  These laudatory terms however, should 
not be given the protection afforded suggestive terms; secondary 
meaning should be required if the laudatory term is to be monopo-
lized by the user.  Part I outlines trademark law and the various 
levels of protection for a mark.  Part II, in chronological order, 
analyzes various cases that discuss the issue of laudatory terms, 
and shows the inconsistencies in courts’ handling of these cases.  
Part III argues that laudatory terms should be analyzed uniformly 
by courts—as being suggestive in a literal sense yet needing sec-
ondary meaning to be protected.  Accordingly, this Note concludes 
that laudatory terms do not fit nicely into the current trademark 
framework and it is this uncertainty that has led the judicial system 
astray. 
I. TRADEMARK LAW 
In order to understand the laudatory term analysis, it is neces-
sary to start at the beginning and take a brief look at the history and 
the purposes of trademark law.  This Part analyzes the trademark 
spectrum of possible marks.  With this background, an analysis of 
laudatory terms and the potential problems they pose will be possi-
ble. 
A. History of Trademark Law 
For thousands of years, civilization has used symbols to iden-
tify ownership and origin of goods and wares.15  It might be that 
the earliest kind of marking was that of branding cattle and other 
animals.16  We derive the English word “brand” from the Anglo-
Saxon word “to-burn”.17  Quarry marks and stonecutters’ signs 
have been found in Egyptian structures erected as early as 4000 
B.C.18  In the ruins at Pompeii, Roman signboards were located.19  
In medieval England, sword manufacturers were required to use 
 
15. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:1. 
16. See id. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
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identifying marks so that defective weapons could be traced back 
to the unfortunate seller.20 
Compared to Anglo-American property law, trademark law is 
very new.21  There are only a handful of trademark cases found in 
seventeenth and eighteenth century England.22  Sometime in the 
early seventeenth century, a cloth-maker was held to have a cause 
of action against a competitor who had copied the plaintiff’s mark 
and placed it on his lesser quality merchandise.23  In the very early 
nineteenth century, English and American common law gradually 
developed the doctrine of “passing off” or “palming off.”24 
Federal trademark law traces its beginnings to 1870, when the 
United States Congress passed the Act of July 8, 1870.25  This stat-
ute was struck down by the Supreme Court less than a decade 
later.26  Congress went back to the drawing board and when Con-
gress finished drawing, it had codified the common law and cre-
ated the Trademark Act of 1946, commonly referred to as the Lan-
ham Act (“Lanham Act” or “Act”).27  The Lanham Act has 
survived the test of time because it has adopted to the outside 
forces of the marketplace when necessary.28 
 
20. See id. 
21. See id. § 5:2. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. (citing Southern v. How, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1618)). 
24. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:2. 
25. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.  See Tara J. Goldsmith, What’s 
Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham Act Clashes with Artistic Expression, 7 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 826 (1996); OATHOUT, supra note 4, at 
6. 
26. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 86 (1879) (finding the 1870 Act unconsti-
tutional because Congress used the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution to 
justify its regulation of trademarks, but stating that the Commerce Clause could be relied 
on); Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 826. 
27. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”) ch 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999)). 
28. See generally Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: 
A Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59 (1996) 
(providing a historical accounting of the Lanham Act); Joseph D. Garon, The Lanham 
Act: A Living Thing, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 55  (1997) (discussing 
the evolution of the Lanham Act).  In the beginning, the only function of a trademark was 
to designate the source of a product, whereas with the growth of industry in the United 
States and around the world, the function has broadened to include, “in addition to identi-
fication of origin, both a guarantee of quality for the purchaser and a source of advertis-
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From the beginning, the Lanham Act has been a triumph for 
the businesses of America.29 The Act is based on the firm principle 
that when a business has spent time and money to develop an iden-
tification for its product, it is not equitable to allow another busi-
ness that has not spent the resources, to use the unique mark and 
cash in on the goodwill of the party that has made the critical in-
vestment.30  Therefore, a trademark owner has the right to stop 
others from infringing on his mark when a likelihood of confusion 
will arise among consumers.31  This is so even if the goods pur-
chased through deception are of equal or higher quality than those 
 
ing for the manufacturer.” Id. at 56 n.8 (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 3.04[1], 3.05 (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996)). 
29. See Garon, supra note 28, at 55. 
30. It has been stated that “[t]he Lanham Act is the embodiment of the purpose to 
secure to every businessman the advantage which public preference for his goods gives to 
him and to protect him in the exclusive right to the names and marks which perpetuate 
the good will which merit earns.”  Garon, supra note 28, at 55-56 (quoting Edward S. 
Rogers, Introduction, in DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL, A 
HANDBOOK ON PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1947)); see 
also Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 829 (citing Frisch’s Restaurant v. Shoney’s Inc., 759 
F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir. 1985)); The Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 
F.3d 955, 963 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the court considers the defendant’s intent in 
adopting his mark). 
31. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West 1998).  Section 114 states: 
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant- 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable  imi-
tation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive; or 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark and 
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, 
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended 
to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies 
hereinafter provided.  Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not 
be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been com-
mitted with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 
Id.; see, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp. 287 F.2d 492 (2d. Cir. 1961) (apply-
ing the Polaroid factors), cert denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1969); Sports Authority 89 F.3d at 
955. 
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that were meant to be purchased.32  Hence, it is confusion and the 
similarity of marks that is the thrust of the Lanham Act.33 
Knowing this, the process of developing and protecting trade-
marks is complex.34  Developing a branded product requires a 
great deal of long-term investing in advertising, promotion and 
strategy.35  A brand is “a seller’s promise to consistently deliver a 
specific set of features, benefits, and services to the buyers.”36  In 
addition, “a brand first brings to mind certain attributes.”37  For in-
stance, Mercedes suggests durable, well engineered, fast and high 
prestige automobiles.38  A potent brand is said to have high brand 
equity.39  Furthermore, it is this high level of brand equity that all 
businesses wish their products to possess.40  Simply, brand equity 
starts with a name.41  Because advertising budgets are normally at 
a fixed amount and every company wants more bang for its buck, 
companies favor names—trademarks and brands, that sell them-
selves.42  This is where marketers get themselves in trouble.  It is 
important to have the right trademark for selling purposes, but it is 
equally important to have a mark that will be protected by the Act 
should others use the same or a very similar mark. Stripped to its 
essence, the law is clear that to succeed in a Lanham Act suit for 
 
32. See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) (finding a Lanham Act violation even though 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods were ‘of equal quality’). 
33. See Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 829-30; see also Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 
F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[o]thers can produce designs similar to the trademark so 
long as there is no likelihood of consumer confusion”); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 
23:1. 
34. See, e.g., John D. Danforth, Effective Management of an International Trade-
mark Portfolio, 455 PLI/PAT. 435, 437 (1996) (providing a methodology for the devel-
opment and protection of a trademark); see also PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING 
MANAGEMENT 444 (8th ed. 1994) (discussing brands and brand management). 
35. See KOTLER, supra note 35, at 444. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. at 445. 
40. KOTLER, supra note 35, at 445. 
41. See id. at 445 (“brand equity is higher, the higher the brand loyalty, name 
awareness, perceived quality, strong brand associations, and other assets such as patents, 
trademarks, and channel relationships”). 
42. See Danforth, supra note 34, at 438. 
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trademark infringement, a plaintiff has two obstacles to surpass: 
(1) the plaintiff must prove that its mark is entitled to protection 
and, just as important, (2) that the defendant’s use of its own mark 
will likely cause confusion with plaintiff’s mark.43  Whether or not 
a mark is protected is clearly important to the success of the prod-
ucts the mark is associated with. 
B. Trademark Spectrum 
The Lanham Act broadly defines the term trademark.  Trade-
marks are any word, symbol or device used in commerce to iden-
tify and distinguish goods.44 
“The strength of a trademark in the marketplace and the degree 
of protection it is entitled to are categorized by the degree of the 
mark’s distinctiveness in the following ascending order: generic, 
descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful.”45  “A generic 
term is a common name, like automobile or aspirin, that describes 
a kind of product”46 and does not identify the source of the prod-
uct.47  The actual name of a product cannot be used as someone’s 
trademark because that would leave others without the critical term 
 
43. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a); see also Sports Auth. Inc. v. Prime Hospitality v. 
Prime Hospitality Corp. 89 F.3d 995, 960 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); Gruner + Jahr 
USA Pub. v. Meredith Corp. 991 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
PARENT’S DIGEST was not likely to cause a sufficient number of ordinary prudent 
purchasers to be confused with PARENTS magazine). 
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127.  A Trademark is: 
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—(1) used by 
a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce 
and applies to register on the principal register established by this Chapter, to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, 
even if that source is unknown. 
Id. 
45. Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1075; see also Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 
108 F.3d 1503, 1508 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the classifications for trademarks); 20th 
Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 
470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 
(2d Cir. 1976) (discussing the spectrum of trademark protection); GREGORY, supra note 
2, at 86-90. 
46. Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1075. 
47. See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 89-90; Gruner + Jahr, 991 F. 2d at 1075. 
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to advertise or publicize its own product.48  Therefore, a common 
generic name is never entitled to trademark protection.49  The Act 
dictates cancellation of a registered mark if at any time it “becomes 
the common descriptive name of an article or substance.”50  Names 
such as “YO-YO,”51 “ASPIRIN,”52 “CELLOPHANE,”53 
“MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION,”54 “THERMOS,”55 
“SHUTTLE,”56 “TOLL HOUSE,”57 “OPRY”58 and “LITE”59 are 
in this generic category.  At the opposite end of the distinctiveness 
spectrum is an arbitrary or fanciful term.60  This type of term may 
always claim trademark protection, “is never a common name for a 
 
48. See SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW 15 (2d ed. 1991). 
49. See DORIS E. LONG, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE LANHAM ACT, 44 (1993) (ci-
tation omitted); see also Gruner + Jahr, 991 F. 2d at 1075 (stating that a common name 
can never obtain trademark protection); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods Co., 85 
F.2d 75, at 80-81 (2d Cir. 1936); King-Seeley Thermos v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 
577, 579-81 (2d Cir. 1963) (discussing thermos as a generic term); see also GREGORY, 
supra note 2, at 89-90 (discussing marks that are incapable of trademark protection). 
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1064(c)(West 1998). 
51. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 
1965) (an action for the alleged infringement of Yo-Yo’s trademark). 
52. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that the 
“aspirin” mark had entered the public domain). 
53. See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 76-77 (2d Cir. 
1936) (holding that DuPont’s advertising had used cellophane as a generic term, descrip-
tive of the product, not of its source). 
54. See National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 
F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the phrase “MBE” had a common descriptive qual-
ity). 
55. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 
1963) (holding that “thermos” is a generic term). 
56. See Eastern Air Lines v. New York Air Lines, 559 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) (holding that “air-shuttle” is a generic term). 
57. See Nestle Co. v. Chester’s Mkt., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 763 (D. Conn. 1983), re-
manded and vacated on other grounds, 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985) (TOLL HOUSE for 
cookies found to be generic despite more than $1 billion in sales over a ten year period 
and $140 million in advertising). 
58. See WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) (OPRY found to be ge-
neric despite use for over fifty years). 
59. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(LITE held to be generic for low-alcohol beer despite very high sales and advertising lev-
els). 
60. See Gruner + Jahr Publ’g v. Meridith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 
1993); see also GREGORY, supra note 2, at 86-87 (stating that a fanciful mark is the most 
distinctive); Danforth, supra note 34, at 438 (discussing the spectrum of trademark pro-
tection). 
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product, and bears little or no relationship to the kind of product 
represented.”61  An arbitrary term has a dictionary meaning but 
does not describe the product at hand.62  An example would be 
Ivory for soap.63  A fanciful mark is a name that is made-up to 
identify the trademark owner’s product—such as EXXON for oil 
products and KODAK for photographic services.64  The categories 
described above are easy for a court to deal with.  The other cate-
gories are not as simple for the judiciary.65 
The other two categories determining a trademark’s strength 
are “suggestive” and “descriptive.”66  A suggestive mark is an in-
herently distinctive mark, just as an arbitrary or fanciful one is.67  
The category of suggestive marks arose because the judicial sys-
tem needed to protect marks the common law did not—any mark 
that was not fanciful or arbitrary.68  There also existed a need to 
give protection to marks that were neither exactly descriptive on 
the one hand nor truly fanciful on the other—a need that was par-
ticularly keen because of the bar in the Trademark Act of 190569 
on the registration of merely descriptive marks regardless of proof 
of secondary meaning.70  Since creating the category, the courts 
have had a difficult time defining it.71  Judge Learned Hand has 
made the unhelpful statement: “[i]t is quite impossible to get any 
rule out of the cases beyond this . . [t]hat the validity of the mark 
 
61. See Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1075-76. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See id.; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 11:2-11:4A; Danforth, supra 
note 34, at 438. 
65. See, e.g., Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 
247, 248 (2d Cir. 1923), aff’d per curiam, 4 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1925) (discussing where a 
mark falls on the spectrum, the court stated, “[i]t is impossible to get any rule out of the 
cases beyond this.”) 
66. See Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1076; see also GREGORY, supra note 2, at 87-88 
(discussing non-inherently distinctive marks). 
67. See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 87; Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1076; see also 
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d 4, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1975). 
68. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:63. 
69. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. 
70. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10; Orange Crush Co. v. California Crushed Fruit 
Co., 297 F. 892 (App. D.C. 1924); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:63. 
71. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10. 
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ends where suggestion ends and description begins.”72  If one took 
a survey of all the trademarks existing today, one would find that 
the majority of those marks would be suggestive of the product.73  
“A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and per-
ception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.”74  It 
has also been said that a suggestive term “suggests, rather than de-
scribes, some characteristic of the goods to which it is applied and 
requires the consumer to exercise his imagination to reach a con-
clusion as to the nature of the goods.”75  Examples of suggestive 
marks include CHARRED KEG for whiskey,76 GUNG HO for 
toys,77 and ORANGE CRUSH for an orange-flavored beverage.78 
Descriptive marks “describe or identify an ingredient, quality, 
characteristic, function feature, purpose, or use of the goods or ser-
vices to which the mark is applied.”79 Courts have utilized a couple 
of tests to determine if a mark is descriptive.80  First, the “diction-
ary definition test” looks to the dictionary definition of the term in 
question to see if that definition “includes or suggests a direct rela-
 
72. Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 247, 248 
(2d Cir. 1923), aff’d per curiam, 4 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1925); see Abercrombie, 537 F.2d 
at 10.  See also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:66 (“The descriptive category almost 
imperceptibly shades over at its fringe into the suggestive domain”); Union Carbide 
Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 
(1976): 
[I]t is often a difficult distinction to draw and is, undoubtedly, often made on an 
intuitive basis rather than as the result of a logical analysis susceptible of ar-
ticulation.  This only emphasizes the need to give due respect to the determina-
tions of the Patent Office if the distinction is to be drawn in a consistent man-
ner. 
Id. at 379. 
73. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:65. 
74. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11; Stix Prods, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs Inc., 
295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see generally General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 
F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940) (examining a suggestive term). 
75. LONG, supra note 49, at 49 (quoting Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 
115-16 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980)). 
76. See In re Majestic Distilling Co., 420 F.2d 1086, 1088 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
77. See Hasbro Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1988). 
78. See Orange Crush Co. v. California Crushed Fruit Co., 54 App. D.C. 313 
(1924). 
79. GREGORY, supra note 2, at 88. 
80. See LONG, supra note 49, at 47. 
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tionship with the products or services in question”.81  Another test 
is the “imagination test”, a test that weighs the link between the ac-
tual words of the mark and the product that they are connected to.82  
“If the term standing alone conveys information as to characteris-
tics of the goods, it is descriptive.”83  A third test considers if com-
petitors would need the term to describe their products.84  Descrip-
tive marks are not protected as marks unless they have acquired 
secondary meaning.85  Secondary meaning has been described by 
one court as the situation where most consumers have come to 
think of the word not as descriptive but as the name of the prod-
uct.86  Descriptive marks are not given exclusive protection with-
 
81. Id. at 48; see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 
792 (5th Cir. 1983)(applying dictionary definition test). 
82. LONG, supra note 50, at 48; see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 
Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying this test). 
83. LONG, supra note 50, at 48. 
84. See id.; see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc. 531 F.2d 366, 379 
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830. 
85. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052, which states: 
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from 
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on ac-
count of its nature unless it— 
. . .  
(e) Consists of a mark which— 
(1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is 
merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them; 
. . . 
(f) Except . . .  nothing herein shall prevent the registration of a mark used by 
the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in com-
merce. 
Id.  Gruner + Jahr Publ’g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1070, 1076 (2d Cir. 1973); see also 
Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp. 464 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1972) (finding 
that plaintiff’s use of a mark, VALMOR, on its products and in its advertising over 45 
years had established a close connection between the trademark name and its products); 
In Re Wileswood, Inc. 201 U.S.P.Q. 400, 404 (P.T.O.-T.T.A.B. 1978) (holding the lauda-
tory, descriptive term AMERICA’S FINEST not registrable because it had not acquired 
secondary meaning with regard to popcorn). 
Id. 
86. See Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc. 846 F.2d 1079 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (quoting Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. SOS Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 
1986)); see also Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that “secondary meaning denotes an association in the mind of the consumer be-
tween the trade dress [or name] of a product and a particular producer.”); Centaur Com-
munications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987) (a 
“mark comes to identify not only the goods but the source of those goods, even though 
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out secondary meaning for two reasons.  First, a descriptive term 
that solely informs the consumer of a particular quality of the 
product does not automatically function to identify and distinguish 
any particular seller’s product.87  As well, because a trademark 
serves to perform this very function, a descriptive mark is not ca-
pable of exclusive trademark protection without a showing of pro-
cured distinctiveness.88  Second, descriptive terms should be avail-
able to all companies to describe their products.89  The Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals stated that trademark law does not 
protect descriptive marks because it is necessary “to maintain free-
dom of the public to use the language involved.”90  Marks that 
have been found to be descriptive include “VISION CENTER,”91 
“EVERREADY,”92 “HOME SAVINGS,”93 and “SHEAR 
PLEASURE.”94 
As one may expect, it takes lots of time and money to have 
one’s goods acquire secondary meaning.95  Therefore, the fine line 
between suggestive and descriptive marks is a critical one indeed.96  
The former has trademark protection from birth while the latter has 
protection only after a showing that consumers link the name and 
the source of the product.97  Therefore, the question of where 
laudatory terms fall on the distinctiveness spectrum, suggestive—
protected as inherently distinctive, or descriptive—protected only 
if secondary meaning has attached, will determine how well they 
 
the relevant consuming public might not know the name of the producer”). 
87. See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 88. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. 
90. In Re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813, (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
91. See Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 
U.S. 1016 (1980) (for a place to purchase eyeglasses). 
92. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976) (for batteries and light bulbs). 
93. See Home Sav. of Am. v. Home Sav. Ass’n., 219 USPQ 157 (S.D. Tex. 1982) 
(for savings and loan services). 
94. See Pullan v. Fulgright, 227 U.S.P.Q. 493 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (for hair-
dresser/beauty shops). 
95. See LONG, supra note 49, at 68-69. 
96. See, e.g., In re Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 167 U.S.P.Q. 128 (T.T.A.B. 
1970); Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997). 
97. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 
1976); In Re Wileswood Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. at 404. 
SOSINSKY.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:36 PM 
1999] LAUDATORY TERMS IN TRADEMARK LAW 739 
stand up to a challenge from a competitor’s term.98 
II. ANALYSIS OF LAUDATORY TERMS 
This section will delve into the heart of the matter—laudatory 
terms.  First, a very brief look at the leading trademark treatise’s 
opinion on laudatory terms will be discussed.  Next, through an 
analysis of case law on the issue, the concept of laudatory terms 
and their usage should become clearer.  This section will look at 
the usage of laudatory terms spanning over one hundred years.  
The forthcoming cases deal with such products as beer, facial 
products, mortgage services and much more. 
“Laudatory” can be defined as “containing or expressing 
praise”.99  Professor McCarthy states: “marks that are merely 
‘laudatory’ and descriptive of the alleged merit of a product are 
also regarded as being ‘descriptive’.”100 In addition, it has been 
stated that “[m]erely laudatory terms are also considered to be de-
scriptive.” 101  However, it has very recently been stated that lauda-
tory marks contain an expression about the quality of the product 
and can be either suggestive or descriptive, depending on the mark 
and the situation.102 
The concept of using laudatory terms as marks goes back as far 
as the Nineteenth century.103  It is well known that beer is taken se-
riously in America and a couple of early cases stress this point.104  
In Beadleston & Woerz v. Cooke Brewing Co.,105 Beadleston filed 
for an injunction to restrain Cooke from using the term “Imperial” 
because “Imperial” was claimed to be a trademark of Beadle-
ston.106  Beadleston used as its trademark the coat of arms of the 
state of New York alongside “Beadleston & Woerz”, the words 
 
98. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997). 
99. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 758 (1984). 
100. 2 MCCARTHY supra note 3, § 11:17. 
101. Danforth, supra note 34, at 438. 
102. See Baila H. Celedonia, Review of the Basic Principles of Trademark Law, 559 
PLI/LIT 147, 157 (1997). 
103. See, e.g., Beadleston & Woerz v. Cooke Brewing Co., 74 F. 229 (7th Cir. 
1896). 
104. See id.; Pabst Brewing v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 F. 110 (7th Cir. 1922). 
105. 74 F. 229 (7th Cir. 1896). 
106. See id. at 230. 
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“Empire Brewery” and the name of the beer to which the trade-
mark was attached.107  The label of Cooke’s beer read “Cooke’s 
Imperial Beer”—these words alongside a shield of stars and stripes 
with the monogram ‘C’.108  The Seventh Circuit stated that there 
was no “palming off” the goods of another because the labels were 
dissimilar, each company’s beer was sold in different geographic 
markets, and Cooke used “Imperial” in good faith.109  Furthermore, 
the Seventh Circuit explained that a trademark must be designed to 
indicate the producer of a commodity and to separate that particu-
lar product from the wares of others.110  Moreover, the court stated 
that the mark cannot be held to be valid if it is used to identify the 
class, grade, style, or utility of the article.111  In holding that the 
plaintiff’s goodwill was not diluted, the court stated that “Imperial” 
was used to describe the quality of the beer whereas the rest of the 
distinctive package identified the source of the beer.112  The court 
concluded that “[t]he monopoly of use granted by the law of 
trademarks should not be extended to embrace terms of doubtful 
signification”.113 
In Pabst Brewing v. Decatur Brewing Co., 114 the term “Blue 
Ribbon” had been registered and used by the plaintiff on a certain 
make of its beer and had acquired secondary meaning due to the 
large number of sales of this brand of beer.115  The defendant, at a 
later date, put out a malt extract under the name of “Blue Ribbon”, 
registered it as its trademark for malt extract, and sold a very large 
 
107. See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. at 230-31. 
110. See id. at 231. 
111. See id. 
112. See id.  The court noted that various dictionaries defined “Imperial” in a very 
standard way—”of superior size or quality.” Id. at 232. The record in this case was filled 
with examples of “Imperial” being used for general quality - “Imperial Champagne,” 
“Imperial Whisky,” “Imperial Gin,” “Imperial Cigars,” “Imperial Ginger Ale,” “Imperial 
Cider” and Imperial Port.” Id. 
113. Id. at 233.  See also McGraw Tire & Rubber Co. v. Griffith, 198 F. 566 
(S.D.N.Y. 1911) (holding there was unfair competition and an infringement of the trade-
mark “Imperial” when the defendant tire company bought “Imperial” tires from the plain-
tiff, subsequently incorporated under the name “Imperial Tire Company,” and sold tires 
with the name “Imperial” that were not made by the plaintiff’s business). 
114. 284 F. 110 (7th Cir. 1922). 
115. See id. at 110. 
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quantity of the extract.116  The court stated that the term “Blue 
Ribbon” signifies high merit and had long acquired special signifi-
cance, wholly apart from its use as a trade name for any product.117  
Holding that the term could only be protected as against other 
beers, it was held that the defendant could use “Blue Ribbon” for 
its brand of malt extract because no likelihood of confusion was 
likely.118  The analysis of the court is unclear whether “Blue Rib-
bon” was seen as a descriptive or a suggestive term, but the court 
clearly limited the scope of protection to a very narrow class of 
product - the same exact product that the complainant marketed.119  
The Pabst court neither mentioned the word “laudatory” nor stated 
that the beer had ever been awarded a “Blue Ribbon”.120  Hence, 
whether or not “Blue Ribbon” was seen as descriptive of the prod-
uct was unclear.121 
A few years later, the Second Circuit, in France Milling Co. 
Inc. v. Washburn-Crosby Co. Inc.,122 stated that the term “Gold 
Medal” is a laudatory phrase that is suggestive of merit.123  The 
France Milling court further stated that the phrase is only joined 
with a business by persistent advertising.124  For this reason, the 
court held that “Gold Medal”, similar to “Blue Ribbon”, could only 
be protected to the specific well-known commodity that it has 
come to be associated with.125  The plaintiff in France Milling had 
sued to protect its trade-mark “Gold Medal” in the prepared pan-
 
116. See id. at 111. 
117. See id. at 112.  Interestingly, the Court gave another definition from the Cen-
tury Dictionary which stated that “Blue Ribbon” indicated membership in total absti-
nence organizations.  Id.  The Court further stated that “Blue Ribbon” had been registered 
in the Patent Office over sixty times for a variety of products. 
118. See Pabst Brewing v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 F. 110, 113 (7th Cir. 1922).  
The court found it noteworthy that the plaintiff, Pabst, had produced its own malt extract 
and did not use the “Blue Ribbon” name.  Id. at 111-112.  Malt extract was used in the 
production of home-brewed beer during the period of national prohibition. 
119. See id. at 112-13. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. 7 F.2d 304, (2d Cir. 1925). 
123. See France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., Inc., 7 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 
1925). 
124. See id. at 306.  Persistent advertising is, of course, heavily linked with the con-
cept of secondary meaning and terms that would be described as “descriptive.” See id. 
125. See id. 
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cake and buckwheat flour market.126  In 1904, the plaintiff ob-
tained a gold medal for the flour at the Louisiana Purchase Exposi-
tion in St. Louis.127  The defendant and counter-claimant, 
Washburn, one of the largest producers of wheat flour in the world, 
had used “Gold Medal” as a trade-mark for wheat flour since 1880, 
but had never, until 1923, produced or sold pancake flour.128  As of 
1923, the two companies were competitors in the prepared flour 
business.  The court stated that as commercial commodities, 
“straight” wheat flour and prepared flour were dissimilar.129  The 
court did not stop there—-it then stated that among consumers, 
“Gold Medal” flour meant defendant’s flour, but because the name 
is not original per se, it could only be protected for the single item 
of wheat flour that its registration was associated with.130  As can 
be seen from the above, these two courts only protected the terms 
“Blue Ribbon” and “Gold Medal” to the extent that they were used 
in connection with a very specific item.131  The early trend, there-
fore, was to classify these laudatory terms as if they were vague 
enough that no merchant should be allowed to monopolize the term 
barring a showing that the public overwhelmingly identified the 
laudatory term with a specific good that the merchant sold—
generally a “descriptive” type of analysis.132 
Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co.133 discussed the term “Ideal” as 
applied to hairbrushes and held that the term was not descriptive 
and hence, was entitled to registration as a trademark.134  The court 
 
126. See id. 
127. See id. at 304.  This fact makes this case somewhat distinguishable from Pabst 
Brewing, where it is unclear if the beer had been awarded a Blue Ribbon. 
128. See France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., Inc., 7 F.2d 304, 304 (2d Cir. 
1925). 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 306.  (“One who devises a new . . . word to describe his wares 
may . . . by timely suit prevent others from taking his word or set of words to gild the re-
pute of even wholly different goods [ ]; but one who takes a phrase which is the com-
monplace of self-praise like ‘Blue Ribbon’ or ‘Gold Medal’ must be content with that 
special field which he labels with so undistinctive a name.”) 
131. See id.; see also Pabst Brewing, 284 F. at 112-13. 
132. See LONG, supra note 49, at 47; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d. Cir. 1976). 
133. 209 F. 37 (2d Cir. 1913). 
134. See id. at 39.  In 1886, Pearson obtained a patent for a brush. See id. at 38.  
Hughes’s predecessors began selling similar brushes which led to an agreement between 
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stated that the “Ideal” brushes were understood by consumers to be 
associated with Hughes, the sellers of the brushes, and not Pearson, 
the manufacturer of the brushes.135  The defendant argued unsuc-
cessfully that the term “Ideal” had been so firmly connected with 
the patented brush so as to become a generic name for the item.136 
Returning to the alcoholic theme, in 1935, the Second Circuit 
held that “Imperial” as applied to whisky could not be registered as 
a valid trademark and therefore, the preliminary injunction issued 
by the district court was reversed.137  The plaintiff claimed owner-
ship of the trademark “Imperial” since 1933 and had been selling 
distilled whiskey under the name “Imperial” since 1887, mainly in 
Canada until 1891, when it began advertising and selling its whis-
key in the United States.138  The defendant, in 1934, began selling 
whiskey in three different grades, “De Luxe,” “Imperial,” and 
“Regal.”139  Interestingly, the defendant’s  sales of whiskey were 
far larger than the plaintiff’s.140  The court first stated that “Impe-
rial” was descriptive and indicative of quality.141  However, it then 
stated that “Imperial” is a generic word, adjective in its nature and 
invalid as a trademark.142  Yet, the court recognized that the ques-
tion of whether a word is capable of becoming distinctive of the 
products that a producer churns out might be a question of fact and 
not to be determined solely on the basis of the descriptive qualities 
of the term.143  Therefore, stating that the term could possibly func-
tion as a trademark and was not actually invalid, the court searched 
for evidence of secondary meaning.144  The court noted the good 
 
Pearson and Hughes’s predecessors whereby Pearson would only sell his brushes to 
Hughes, with such brushes being called “Ideal.” Id. 
135. See id. 
136. See Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co. 209 F. 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1913). 
137. See Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 
1935). 
138. See id. at 837. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
141. See id.  The court also stated that “Imperial” is commonly used as a synonym 
for imposing size, appearance or excellence. See id. at 835. 
142. See Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836, 835 (2d 
Cir. 1935). 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 839. 
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faith on the part of the defendants and stated that because the de-
fendant had no intention of utilizing the good name of the plaintiff 
to sell its own products, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to pro-
vide evidence that “‘Imperial’ and the certain whisky made by it 
had become synonymous to the buying public.”145  In this case, the 
court differed with the France Milling court in that here, the court 
stated “Imperial” was “descriptive” and “generic”146 whereas in 
France Milling, the court stated that “Gold Medal” was “sugges-
tive” of merit.147 
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in 
1954, stated that the phrase “Consistently Superior” was laudatory 
or exclamatory, and the applicant seeking to register this phrase on 
the Principal Register of the United States Patent Office would 
need to have very convincing proof that the term had acquired dis-
tinctiveness under the Lanham Act; this mark did not meet that 
high burden.148  The applicant had used “Consistently Superior” in 
conjunction with its bakery products since 1919 but did not file an 
application to register the phrase as a trademark until 1947.149  The 
applicant advertised its products and the phrase in order forms, 
pamphlets, magazines, and on the side of the applicant’s trucks.150  
 
145. Id. at 839. 
146. See id. at 837-38. 
147. See France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304,306 (2d Cir. 
1925). 
148. See Application of Duvernoy & Sons, Inc. 212 F.2d 202 (C.C.P.A. 1954).  15 
U.S.C.A. § 1052 states: 
Except as expressly excluded . . . nothing herein shall prevent the registration 
of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s 
goods in commerce.  The Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence 
that the mark has become distinctive, as applied to the applicant’s goods in 
commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a 
mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years next preceding the date of 
the filing of the application for its registration. 
Id. 
149. See id. at 203. 
150. See id.  The court quoted approvingly from the Soliciter for the Patent Office: 
It is submitted that the evidence in the present case clearly fails to show that the 
primary purpose of the words ‘Consistently Superior’ was to indicate origin.  
There is no exhibit offered in which those words appear without the name of 
the appellant and, in most cases, the words are much less prominently displayed 
than the name.  Thus, for example, on the wagons and trucks pictured . . . [in] 
the record, the name Duvernoy & Sons, Inc., always appears in bold letters, 
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Besides stating that the mark had not attained the pivotal distinct-
iveness, the court also held that “Consistently Superior” is a lauda-
tory statement incapable of indicating the source of a good or ser-
vice.151  Interestingly, the court did not mention the “descriptive”, 
“suggestive”, or “generic” designations in its opinion.152 
The 1960’s may have ushered in a change in American think-
ing, but the courts continued prodding along in their analysis of 
laudatory terms.  The Murray Corporation of America opposed 
Red Spot Paint and Varnish Company’s application for a trade-
mark of the term “Easytint” because the latter wished to use that 
term for white paint that was made to be mixed with other colors 
of paint, and the former had previously registered “Easy” for use 
with “[e]namel supplied in self-spraying containers for application 
to domestic laundry and other appliances”.153  The question for the 
court was whether “Easytint” was sufficiently close to “Easy” so as 
to be likely to cause confusion to consumers.154  At the outset, the 
court found “Easy” to be suggestive and that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to exclusive use of “Easy.”155  Noting that the marks prod-
 
while ‘Consistently Superior’ is so small as to be almost illegible in some of the 
photographs.  It is scarcely conceivable that anyone seeing such a wagon or 
truck could form the opinion that the words ‘Consistently Superior’ were relied 
on to inform the public as to the origin of the product. 
Id. at 204. 
151. See id. 
152. See id. at 202-04. 
153. The Murray Corp. of America v. Red Spot Paint and Varnish Co., 280 F.2d 
158, 159 (C.C.P.A. 1960). 
154. See id. 
155. See id. at 160-61.  In reaching its conclusion, the court noted a number of third 
party registrations for paint products such as “Easycoat,” “Eze-Ply,” “Easy Way” and 
“Strikeasy”.  See id. at 159 n.2.  The court also surveyed the “1953 Trademark Directory” 
issued by the Trademark Bureau of the National Paint, Varnish and Lacquer Association, 
Inc. which included various marks such as “Easy,” “Easyflo,” “Easy-Kote,” “Easylac,” 
“E-Z-Cleen,” “E-Z-Duz-It,” “and “Ezy-To-Use.”  See id. at 159 n.3.  In noting the pleth-
ora of marks, the court stated: 
In determining whether a word or syllable has a descriptive or suggestive sig-
nificance as applied to merchandise it is proper to take notice of the extent to 
which it has been used in trademarks by others on such merchandise.  If it has 
been frequently so used, the inference is warranted that it is not purely arbi-
trary; that it would be likely to be understood by purchasers as identifying or 
describing the merchandise itself, rather than the source thereof, and hence as 
having little or no trademark significance. 
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ucts were somewhat different and were sold through different 
channels, the court stated that no likelihood of confusion ex-
isted.156  In 1962, the Second Circuit held that the phrase “Su-
preme” could not be protected absent a clear showing that the 
phrase had come to be regarded among consumers as indicative of 
the company’s vodka.157  The appellant in this action was question-
ing the Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which 
sustained the appellee’s opposition to the appellant’s registration of 
the trademark “Supreme”.158  The court stated that such expres-
sions are “puffing of wares” which do not indicate of origin, are 
generally available to all companies, and therefore are not entitled 
 
Id. at 392 (quoting Shoe Corp. of Am. v. Juvenile Shoe Corp. of Am., 266 F.2d 793, 796 
(C.C.P.A., 1959). 
156. See id. at 159-61. The factors used to determine likelihood of confusion are: 
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, (2) the degree of similarity between the 
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) the 
likelihood that the plaintiff will ‘bridge the gap’ between the two products, (5) 
actual confusion between the two marks, (6) the defendant’s good faith in 
adopting its mark, (7) the quality of the defendant’s product(s), and (8) the so-
phistication of buyers of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods or services. 
Sports Authority, 89 F.3d at 960 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)); see also Plus Prods. v. Medstet Modalities Assoc., Inc., 211 
U.S.P.Q. 1199 (1981) (holding that “Zn-Plus,” “Mn-Plus,” and “Ca-Plus” for vitamin 
supplements were compound marks, suggestive in nature, and not in conflict with the op-
poser’s mark, “Plus,” also in the vitamin field); Visa Int. Service Ass’n. v. E. Fin. Fed. 
Credit Union 967 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that opposer’s mark for its network 
linking automatic teller machines, “Plus System”, was a weak and suggestive term, 
laudatory in nature, similar to Plus Product’s marks, and that Visa could not get a pre-
liminary injunction preventing Eastern from using a “Money Plus” Mastercard); Avtex 
Fibers Inc. v. Gentex Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. 625 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (holding that “PFR Plus” 
is not merely descriptive, but rather suggests that the applicant’s fabrics contain some-
thing more than permanently flame retardant fibers and therefore, the term is registrable). 
157. See Supreme Wine Co., Inc. v. The Am. Distilling Co., 310 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 
1962).  The court relied on In re Lewis Cigar Mfg. Co., 95 U.S.P.Q. 224 (Pat. Off. 1952),  
which stated: 
Section 23 of the [Lanham] Act does not prohibit the registration of a trade-
mark merely because it is laudatory in character.  However, Section 23 does re-
quire that the mark be of such a nature that it is capable of distinguishing appli-
cant’s goods or services.  From the above quoted definition of ‘Supreme’ it is 
seen that it is a common ordinary laudatory term which is available for use by 
producers of merchandise in various fields to advertise their products, and 
hence is incapable of indicating the source of origin. 
Supreme Wine Co., 310 F.2d at 890. 
158. See id. at 888-89. 
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to trademark protection.159 
In 1970, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals, in Roux Laboratories, Inc., v. Clairol Inc.,160 stated that the 
phrase “Hair Color So Natural Only Her Hairdresser Knows For 
Sure” was laudatory and “somewhat descriptive” of the desired 
qualities of the product but capable of acquiring distinctiveness as 
a trademark if it had acquired secondary meaning among consum-
ers.161  Roux’s opposition to the registration of this term was based 
on a belief that it, like Clairol, was in the business of selling hair 
tinting products and that it had used certain descriptive terms in its 
advertisements.162  The court noted that Clairol had a very success-
ful advertising campaign163 which sufficiently hyped the slogan so 
that it served as a means by which consumers could identify the 
goods from a certain source.164 
Demonstrating that reversals of lower court decisions are not 
uncommon in laudatory mark analysis, the Patent Office Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Board, reversing the Examiner of Trade-
marks, held that “Super Iron” was suggestive and registrable be-
cause it either signified that the soil supplement contained a greater 
amount of iron than most soil supplements or contained iron of a 
higher quality than the iron found in other soil supplements.165  
The court distinguished this situation from one where the term 
 
159. See id. at 889.  The court relied on the test in Hiram Walker and stated that the 
applicant did not meet this burden of showing that the term had come to be associated 
with its products.  Id. 
160. 427 F.2d 823 (1970). 
161. See id. at 828.  The court found that Clairol’s large amount of advertising had 
made an impact in the public and the phrase could be registered.  See id. at 829. 
162. See id. at 824.  Roux had used the following advertising copy in its ads: “only 
you and your hairdresser know where nature stopped and Roux began,” “to pick up 
where nature left off . . . [t]he essence of haircoloring is to look so natural that no one 
knows you used a cosmetic.”  See id. at 824 n.3. 
163. See id. at 825.  The ads featured a large, color photograph of an attractive 
woman, often accompanied by a young child; the question ‘Does she . . . or doesn’t she?’ 
prominently imprinted on or above the photograph; the slogan ‘Hair Color So Natural 
Only Her Hairdresser Knows For Sure’ also conspicuously imprinted on or below the 
photograph, and set apart from the other portions of the advertisement. See id. 
164. See Roux Laboratories, 427 F.2d 823, 831 (1970). 
165. See In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., 167 U.S.P.Q. 128 (T.T.A.B. 1970).  The 
Examiner of Trademarks refused registration, stating that “‘super’ is variously defined as 
having the (specified) ingredient present in a large or unusually large proportion. . . .” Id. 
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“Super” is used in conjunction with the name of the applicant’s 
goods.166  Further showing the uncertainty in the system is the de-
cision of the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board in the In re Ralston Purina Company matter.167  An 
application was filed to register “Ralston Super Slush,” “Slush” 
disclaimed, on the Principal Register for a concentrate that is used 
to make a slush drink.168  The Examiner refused registration on the 
ground that “Super” when used in combination with goods, is 
solely an “adjectival superlative that merely describes a quality of 
applicant’s slush drink and therefore must be included in the dis-
claimer with the word “Slush”.169  The Board stated that “whether 
a term or word is merely descriptive must be decided in relation to 
the goods or services for which registration is sought, the context 
in which it is used, and the average purchasers of such goods or 
services.”170  After noting that the term “Super” had been held to 
be both descriptive and suggestive, the Board found that the term 
“Super” was heavily used in advertising as puffery and connotated 
a vague desirable quality that was not merely descriptive of the 
product it was associated with, a concentrate for making a slush 
type soft drink, the Examiner was reversed and registration was al-
lowed.171 
In a trademark infringement case in which the plaintiff’s corpo-
rate name was possibly being diluted, the First Circuit, in 1972, 
stated that “Valmor,” as applied to goods such as face powder, tal-
cum powder, wigs and hair tonic, was suggestive of quality.172  
Standard Products Corporation, the defendant, appealed from an 
order of the district court enjoining it from further use of “Valmor” 
in its beauty aid products, and canceling its registration of “Val-
 
166. See id. 
167. 191 U.S.P.Q. 237 (T.T.A.B. 1976). 
168. See id. at 237-38. 
169. See id. 
170. See id.; see also In Re Crompton Co., 170 U.S.P.Q. 166 (T.T.A.B. 1971) 
(holding that the term “super Wle” for corduroy fabric is not merely descriptive, even 
though it is laudatory in nature). 
171. See Ralston Purina, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 238. 
172. See Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 
1972). 
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mor.”173  Also, the court stated that although under some circum-
stances self-laudatory trademarks should not be registered or pro-
tected, the plaintiff, through forty-five years of advertising, had es-
tablished a strong link between the mark and its products.174 
In In re American Cynamid Company,175 the Patent Office 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, in 1973, found the phrase 
“The Premium Grade Malathion” capable of functioning as a 
trademark for an insecticide, and therefore the term could be regis-
tered on the Supplemental Register.176  Hitting on a recurrent 
theme of reversing lower courts, the Board reversed the Exam-
iner’s decision that the trademark was so descriptive as to be inca-
pable of distinguishing the applicant’s insecticide from other simi-
lar products.177  The Board noted that the phrase was laudatory but 
still capable of protection.178  The Board was persuaded by the ap-
plicant’s showing of the mark’s conspicuous location on the labels 
of the product, the level of advertising, and affidavits from twenty 
one mosquito control officers from various parts of the country 
stating that they associate “The Premium Grade Malathion” with 
the applicant.179  Recognize this case is different than the others 
above because the applicant sought to register the phrase on the 
 
173. See id. at 201.  The defendant’s registrations for “VALMOR,” canceled by the 
district court, were for a combination electric hair brush and massager, a cordless electric 
manicure set, an electric hair curling iron and similar other products.  Id. 
174. See id. at 202.  The Appellate court held the district court’s finding that there 
was a likelihood of confusion (the federal statutory test of trademark infringement) not to 
be clearly erroneous.  See id. at 203.  The district court concluded that there was a “sub-
stantial likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers as to the source of the various 
products sold under the Valmor name.” Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 
F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1972).  This conclusion was based on findings that the products of 
the plaintiff and defendant were closely related in function, were advertised in similar 
places, appealed to the same consumer demographic and were sold in the same type of 
store. See id. 
175. 176 U.S.P.Q. 350 (T.T.A.B. 1973). 
176. See id. at 351.  The test for whether something could be registered on the Sup-
plemental Register is whether the mark could become recognized, through use in com-
merce, by the average purchaser or is distinctive of the applicant’s goods. See OATHOUT, 
supra note 4, at 82-83.  Prior distinctiveness is not a prerequisite for registration of a 
mark on the Supplemental Register. See id. 
177. See American Cynamid Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. at 350-51. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. at 350. 
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more lenient Supplemental Register rather than on the Principal 
Register.180 
Plus Products v. Redken Laboratories, Inc.181 is a variation on 
the current theme because it discusses the protection that laudatory 
terms are afforded when these words are combined with other non-
laudatory words.  In Plus Products, the opposer of the registration 
had been using “Plus” as a trademark for cosmetics, vitamins 
preparations for the skin and hair, high protein products, and vita-
mins.182  The applicant applied to register “pH-Plus” for a success-
ful line of cosmetic products that had been used for approximately 
five years under that name.183  The “likelihood of confusion” issue 
turned on whether the simultaneous marketing of the various prod-
ucts of applicant and opposer with the “pH Plus” and “Plus” marks 
respectively, were likely to cause confusion.184  After noting the 
plethora of marks for cosmetics and toiletries that contain the word 
“Plus”, the Appeal Board stated that highly suggestive terms, be-
cause of their prolific registration, have been given limited protec-
tion only for a “substantially identical designation and/or to the 
subsequent use thereof on substantially similar goods.”185  The 
Board then stated that the addition of another term, whether sug-
gestive or descriptive, to a highly suggestive or laudatory term, 
may be sufficient to distinguish between the two marks at issue.186  
In this case, the court said it was a very close call whether “pH” 
could distinguish in this manner because the products at issue were 
very similar.187  In holding that “pH-Plus” was not primarily de-
scriptive of the applicant’s goods, the Board heavily relied on the 
amount of sales and advertising accruing to the applicant and then 
 
180. See id. 
181. 199 U.S.P.Q. 111 (T.T.A.B. 1978). 
182. See id. at 112. 
183. See id. at 113. 
184. See id. at 114.  The Board stated that the suggestive connotation of “Plus” is 
the exact reason why the applicant, opposer, and others in various fields have utilized 
and/or registered as trademarks designations that contain the word “Plus”. Id. at 115.  
However, the Board reiterated that these other valid registrations will not validate the ap-
plicant’s mark if it would be confusingly similar to another mark. See id. 
185. Id. at 116.  Marks registered included “Beauty Plus,” “Plus 30,” “Color Plus,” 
“K-Plus,” and  “Iron Plus.”  Id. at 115. 
186. See id. at 116-17. 
187. See id. at 117. 
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concluded that for those people exposed to the advertising of the 
applicant, “pH-Plus” served as an indication of source.188  The 
Board primarily looked to the applicant’s large sales volume to 
find that there was no likelihood of confusion.189 
The Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board, when deciding In Re Wileswood, Inc.,190 stated that its task 
was to determine “whether ‘America’s Best Popcorn!’ and ‘Amer-
ica’s Favorite Popcorn!’. . . are merely suggestive of high qual-
ity . . ., and thus registrable . . . or are so laudatory and lacking in 
the ability to distinguish applicant’s goods . . . as to be unregistra-
ble.”191  The applicant claimed that to be unregisterable under the 
Act, the mark must be ‘only’ descriptive of the goods.192  Further-
more, the applicant argued that the mark as a whole must be 
weighed and that these marks were “attention getting, tongue-in-
cheek, self-laudatory, or boastful designations or characterizations 
of its popcorn” which could not be literally true because no one 
could objectively measure this popcorn against all others.193  The 
Board stated that the meaning of the marks must incorporate the 
goods which they are linked with, the context these expressions are 
used, the relevance of the marks in relation to the goods, and the 
probable reaction of consumers to the phrases as these phrases are 
perceived in the market.194  No advertising expenditures were in-
cluded in the record though the Board noted that the products were 
sold in only three retail outlets.195  Since the Board found that the 
terms were laudatory and descriptive, it held that proof of secon-
dary meaning was required in order to register these term.196  Fol-
lowing the rationale of McCarthy’s treatise,197 the Board further 
 
188. See Plus Prod. v. Redken Lab., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 111 (T.T.A.B. 1978).  The 
term “pH” was disclaimed as a measure of acidity or alkalinity.  Id. 
189. See id. 
190. 201 U.S.P.Q. 400 (1978). 
191. See id. at 401. 
192. See id. at 400; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e). 
193. See id. at 400-01. 
194. See id. at 401. 
195. See In Re Wileswood, Inc. 201 U.S.P.Q. at 401-02. 
196. See id. at 404.  The Board looked to an earlier case that canceled that registra-
tion on the Supplemental Register of  “America’s Finest” for overalls.  See Kotzin v. Levi 
Strauss & Company, 111 U.S.P.Q. 161 (1956). 
197. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:18. 
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stated that because a descriptive term merely informs the consumer 
of the supposed quality of a product, and many products have simi-
lar qualities, the descriptive term will not assist the consumer in 
differentiating products of different producers.198  The Board cited 
BEST for writing paper and TASTY for bread as examples of 
terms that are laudatory and informative, stating that the informa-
tion conveyed is the vendor’s claims for its wares.199  Refusal of 
registration was affirmed.200 
The issue of how a laudatory mark can change over time was 
discussed in 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc.,201 
in which the Second Circuit reversed the district court and held 
that “Cozy Warm Energy Savers” was a descriptive term with a 
meaning that had changed over time.202  The plaintiff was in the 
business of selling women’s pajamas and nightgowns to retailers, 
mail order and discount houses.203  The defendant, located in the 
building next to the plaintiff’s, sold these same items as well as 
many other clothing items.204  The plaintiff’s garments came in  
plastic bags which contained various inserts, one stating in bold 
print “Cozy Warm ENERGY SAVERS” in white with the trade-
mark notice attached.205  The mark was accepted by the Trademark 
Office on the condition that 20th Century, the plaintiff, disclaim 
exclusive use of “cozy” and “warm” apart from the registered 
 
198. See In re Wileswood, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. at 402. 
199. See id. at 402-04.  See also Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & 
Co., 127 F.2d 318, 29 C.C.P.A. 1024 (1942) (holding “Handkerchiefs of the Year” inva-
lid).  The court explained: 
In the final analysis such expressions as we are discussing with relation to ob-
jects of trade are a ‘puffing of wares’ and are intended to call attention to the 
superiority of the advertised goods.  Such expressions are a condensed form of 
describing in detail the outstanding character or quality of the objects to which 
they are applied . . . [C]ommon expression[s] which can indicate nothing but 
high quality surely would not be indicative of origin to the purchasing public. 
Id.; In re Nat’l. Tea Co., 166 U.S.P.Q. 288 (T.T.A.B. 1970) (holding the expression 
“Smackin Good” as applied to food products was similar to “delicious” and merely de-
scriptive of the quality of the goods). 
200. See id. at 404. 
201. 747 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). 
202. See id. at 87. 
203. See id. at 85. 
204. See id. at 85. 
205. See id. 
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mark.206  Just a few months after registration, defendant began sell-
ing pajamas and nightgowns using a tag containing the words 
“Cozy Warm CONSERVES-ENERGY.”207  The writing was quite 
similar to 20th Century’s.208  The Second Circuit stated that before 
the energy crisis in the 1970’s, the mark would have been consid-
ered suggestive, but in 1984, the term was merely descriptive of 
the product and needed secondary meaning to be protected.209  The 
Second Circuit stated that as a result of the energy crisis in the 
1970’s, numerous clothing vendors began using terms such as “en-
ergy saving” and “cozy warm” to push the acceptance of their 
products.210  This led to a well-informed public, the court contin-
ued, so that consumers could readily link the term to the virtues of 
the product.211  The Second Circuit also stated that a term can be 
descriptive in two ways—”[i]t can literally describe the product, or 
it can describe the purpose or utility of the product.”212  The case 
was remanded so that the district court could look into secondary 
meaning.213 
In 1986, the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board dealt with a foreign translation issue when it upheld 
the decision of the Examining Attorney and refused to register the 
term “Selecta” for a beer.214  The Board rejected the applicant’s 
 
206. See 20th Century Wear, 747 F.2d at 85. 
207. See id. at 85-6. 
208. See id. at 86. 
209. See id. at 88. 
210. See id. 
211. See 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 
1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). 
212. See id.; see also RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 18.05 (4th ed. 1983).  Under the first branch, “if quali-
ties, ingredients, effects or other features of the product are indicated naturally and in or-
dinary language, so that the consumer understands its significance without any exercise 
of the imagination, the words are descriptive.”  Id.  Under the second strand, Callmann 
explains three subcategories of marks that describe the product’s purpose or utility: “(1) 
marks describing the problem or condition that the trademarked product is designed to 
remedy . . .; (2) marks that describe the use to which the product or service is put; and (3) 
marks that describe the effect that the product or service is suppose to produce after it is 
used.”  747 F.2d at 88 (citing CALLMANN § 18.05). 
213. See 20th Century Wear, 747 F.2d at 90. 
214. See In Re San Miguel Corporation, 229 U.S.P.Q. 617 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (refus-
ing registration on the ground that SELECTA was merely descriptive of the beer.) 
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position that the mark, the Spanish term for “Select”, would not be 
translated to “Select” by the average beer purchaser and therefore 
would be viewed as an indication of origin.215  Using the doctrine 
of foreign equivalents, under which the foreign words are trans-
lated into their English equivalents and then tested for descriptive-
ness or genericness, the Board concluded that the term was “lauda-
torily descriptive.”216 
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows sued to 
protect their slogan, “The Greatest Show on Earth”.217  Ringling 
Bros., the owner of the trademark, obtained a preliminary injunc-
tion from the lower court, that was affirmed by the Seventh Cir-
cuit, against the defendant’s car dealership that ordered the defen-
dant to cease using the phrase “The Greatest Used Car Show On 
Earth”.218  The district court had found that the Ringling Bro.’s 
mark was descriptive and weak, but also believed that the mark 
had become associated with the famous circus.219  The Seventh 
Circuit found that the defendant, by utilizing big red circus-styled 
lettering, attempted to use the slogan in a way that was designed to 
evoke the circus.220  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that pro-
tecting the Ringling Bros. mark would not be the equivalent of 
granting Ringling Bros. a monopoly over other laudatory slo-
gans.221  The “final straw” was the court’s finding that the defen-
dant did not act in good faith when it first used its slogan.222 
In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and held that “Deluxe” for 
canned pork and beans could be registered on the Supplemental 
Register, because it was capable of becoming distinctive through 
 
215. See id. at 618. 
216. See id.  “Select” had been disclaimed on the applications of beer producers in 
the past (i.e. Stroh’s and Koehler).  In addition, the Board noted that numerous third par-
ties outside the business industry had used this term in their marks to describe the alleged 
high quality of their product.  Id. 
217. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-
Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988). 
218. See id. at 481. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. at 482. 
221. See id at 482-83. 
222. See Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 484. 
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use in commerce, even though the term is merely descriptive and 
could not be registered on the Principal Register.223  The Court 
admitted that the term is generally a laudatory one, but “laudation 
is not inimical to a term’s capability of functioning as a trade-
mark.”224  The term did not describe a particular grade of canned 
pork and beans.225  The Court went on to state that first, the 
C.C.P.A. has previously described “Deluxe” as “obviously sugges-
tive” and “descriptive.”226  Second, “Deluxe” was used in many 
trademarks and trade names.227 Lastly, the capability of “Deluxe” 
to function as a trademark is shown by the many registrations of 
the term for various food products.228  The Board had argued first, 
that “Deluxe” is not a common descriptive name for canned pork 
and beans containing bacon and brown sugar and second, does not 
signify anything other than a “vaguely desirable characteristic”.229  
However, the Federal Circuit relied on previous registrations for 
“Deluxe” and held that because of the lenient requirements of the 
Supplemental Register, the applicant had a right to register the 
mark there.230 
The Second Circuit, in a case mentioned in the Introduction, 
recently dealt with the issue of a numeric term, “100%”, as a 
 
223. See In re Bush Bros. & Co., 884 F.2d 569 (Fed. Cir. 1989); 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1052(f) (providing that five years of exclusive and continuous use as a mark may be 
deemed prima facie evidence of secondary meaning.); see also supra note 176, for a dis-
cussion of the Supplemental Register; In re Wella Corp., 565 F.2d 143, 144 (C.C.P.A. 
1977) (stating that “descriptiveness alone does not necessarily preclude registration on 
the Supplemental Register.”), quoted in Bush Bros., 884 F.2d at 570.  The Bush Brothers 
court noted that generally, courts have not scrutinized potential applications for registra-
tion on the Supplemental Register because obtaining registration on this Register is very 
liberal. Id. at 570. 
224. 884 F.2d at 572.  The Court relied on In re Ralston Purina, 191 U.S.P.Q. 237 
(T.T.A.B. 1976), In re Am. Cynamid, 176 U.S.P.Q. 350 (T.T.A.B. 1973), and In re Occi-
dental Petroleum, 167 U.S.P.Q. 128 (T.T.A.B. 1970). Id. 
225. See 884 F.2d at 572.  The applicant’s canned pork and beans contained bacon 
and brown sugar. See id. at 571-72. 
226. See id.  The Court noted that “Deluxe Choice” for pasteurized processed 
cheese and “Creamy Deluxe” for frostings (with a disclaimer for creamy) have been reg-
istered on the Principal Register.  Id. 
227. See id. 
228. See 884 F.2d, at 572. 
229. Id. 
230. See id. 
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laudatory mark.231  Both the plaintiff, Estee Lauder, and the defen-
dant, The Gap, were planning on using “100%” as part of their 
trademark and in conjunction with their respective skin care prod-
ucts.232  Estee Lauder beat The Gap to the market and sued to pre-
vent The Gap from using this term on its products.233  The South-
ern District of New York found that Lauder’s “100%” mark was 
suggestive and therefore protectable because the term “100%” had 
no particular meaning, but rather suggested an idea of quality.234  
New York’s Southern District also found that “100% Time Release 
Moisturizer”, the full name of Lauder’s product, was suggestive in 
nature.235  The Second Circuit agreed that 100% was suggestive 
and stated “[a] term that is merely self-laudatory, such as ‘plus’ or 
‘super,’ seeking to convey the impression that a product is excel-
lent or of especially high quality, is generally deemed sugges-
tive.”236  Additionally, the court noted that marks should be looked 
at in context, rather than in the abstract.237  When looking at the 
mark in context, the Court determined that because “100% Time 
Release Moisturizer” had a few possible meanings, the term was 
suggestive and protected without any analysis of secondary mean-
ing.238  However, the court found that because there was no likeli-
hood of confusion among ordinarily prudent consumers, Estee 
Lauder was not entitled to relief.239  The Court implied that nu-
 
231. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997). 
232. Id. at 1506. 
233. Id. at 1506-07. 
234. See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 595, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996), rev’d on other grounds, 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997). 
235. See id. at 609.  The court said the phrase “100% Time Release Moisturizer” 
could be interpreted three ways: “(1) this bottle contains nothing but time release mois-
turizer,  (2) this product moisturizes 100% of the time, and  (3) this is 100% (the brand) 
time release moisturizer . . . .” Id. 
236. Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d, at 1509. See, e.g., Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, 
Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1983) (“‘PLUS,’ when applied to goods, ‘merely im-
plies additional quantity or quality’”); cited in Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1509; In re Ral-
ston Purina Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. at 237-38 (“‘SUPER,’ when used to ‘connote a vague de-
sirable characteristic or quality allegedly connected with [a] product,’ is suggestive”) 
cited in Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1509. 
237. Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1509. 
238. See id. at 1510. 
239. See id. at 1510-12.  The Second Circuit found that the “100%” in both products 
were (1)dissimilar in appearance; (2)the packaging was different; (3)”100” is not origi-
nal; 4)the products are sold in different stores; (5)Estee Lauder’s product would be priced 
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merical terms, if used in a vague, non-arbitrary way and not used 
because an attribute was actually measured or tested, are in danger 
of not being protected by the Lanham Act.240  It has been sug-
gested that the court may have been making a distinction between 
“laudatory terms that describe some quality of a product . . . which 
it would deem ‘descriptive’ - and those laudatory terms that merely 
assert high-quality generally regardless of the product or ser-
vice . . . which it would deem ‘suggestive’.”241 
The final case discussed in this Part, Platinum Home Mortgage 
Corp. v. Platinum Financial Group, Inc.,242 shows that the analysis 
of courts is no better now than it was many years ago.  In this mat-
ter, the plaintiff, an offeror of mortgage services, sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to keep the defendant, another offeror of mortgage 
services, from using “Platinum” in its name.243  The Seventh Cir-
cuit stated that under the common law, terms denoting quality were 
protectable only upon a showing of secondary meaning.244  The 
lower court explained that the rationale for labeling these terms as 
descriptive is that “adjectives which can be truthfully applied to a 
whole range of goods and services cannot identify the goods of one 
particular firm.”245  Similar to the court in 20th Century, the lower 
court stated that words indicating quality often see their meanings 
 
almost twenty times more than the Gap’s; (6)Estee Lauder does not plan to enter Gap’s 
market; and (7)and that the Gap did not act in bad faith.  Id. at 1512. 
240. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(A) (West 1998).  Lauder’s vice president of skin care 
marketing decided to use “100%” as the trademark “because it would suggest to consum-
ers certain attributes of” the product—its long lasting quality and the notion that it is the 
best such product available. See 932 F. Supp. at 599. 
241. Dawn Marie Bottie, Marketer v. Lawyer: Age-Old Tension Resurfaces in Gap 
100% Case, 3 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 8, (May 1997). 
242. 149 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 1997). 
243. See id. at 725.  Both parties offered their services in Illinois. 
244. See id. at 728; see also Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Grp., 
Inc., No. 97 C 5293, 1997 WL 567909, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 1997), aff’d 149 F.3d 722 
(citing In re Bush Bros., 884 F.2d 569 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Plus Products v. Plus Discount 
Foods, 722 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1983); Hiram Walker & Sons v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 
F.2d 836 (2d Cir.1935)). 
245. See Platinum Home Mortgage Corp., 1997 WL 567909, at *2 (citing 2 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 11:18).  The Seventh Circuit stated “Platinum” describes 
the quality of the plaintiff’s services but the term does not identify one particular source 
or origin of these services. See Platinum, 149 F.3d at 728. 
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change over time and across cultures.246  Furthermore, the lower 
court stated that once, people thought of “Platinum” primarily to 
describe jewelry or metal, but today people think of the term as in-
dicating excellence; it may be truthfully applied to many goods and 
services.247  Agreeing with the lower court, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the term was descriptive, and that “Platinum” de-
scribed the quality of the plaintiff’s business and needed secondary 
meaning to be protected, connection that could not be found.248 
III. LAUDATORY TERMS ARE LITERALLY SUGGESTIVE, NOT 
DESCRIPTIVE, YET SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED UNDER THE 
LANHAM ACT ABSENT SECONDARY MEANING 
In this last section of this piece two general arguments will be 
championed.  It will first be shown that laudatory terms, despite of-
ten being treated in a legal sense as if they were descriptive, are in 
fact suggestive of the products they represent.  By employing a 
broad definition of “descriptive,” it can be shown that the terms 
discussed throughout this piece do not come within the definition.  
It will also be posited that secondary meaning should be found be-
fore these terms can be protected.  In this context, many of the 
courts’ decisions and/or rationales will be critiqued.  Lastly, a sim-
ple solution will be proposed that should help the courts success-
fully cope with the laudatory term issue. 
A. Laudatory Terms, No Matter How One Slices Them, Do 
Not Describe Anything 
Though Professor McCarthy states that laudatory terms are de-
scriptive,249 this can be quickly disproved by an analysis into the 
actual meaning of “descriptive.”  It can be shown that laudatory 
terms are not “descriptive” by stating the broadest definition of 
“descriptive” found and then showing that even this inclusive defi-
nition is not adequate to keep the laudatory terms discussed above 
within its grasp.  The definition provided by Rudolf Callmann will 
 
246. See Platinum Home Mortgage Corp., 1997 WL 567909 at *2-3. 
247. See id. 
248. Platinum, 149 F.3d at 728-29. 
249. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17. 
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be used: a term can be descriptive in two ways—”[i]t can literally 
describe the product, or it can describe the purpose or utility of the 
product.”250  Callmann breaks down “descriptive” into two seg-
ments. Under the first branch, “if qualities, ingredients, effects or 
other features of the product are indicated naturally and in ordinary 
language, so that the consumer understands its significance without 
any exercise of the imagination, the words are descriptive.”251  Un-
der the second strand, Callmann explains three subcategories of 
marks that describe the product’s purpose or utility.252  First, 
“marks describing the problem or condition that the trademarked 
product is designed to remedy.”253  Second, “marks that describe 
the use to which the product or service is put.”254  Last, “marks that 
describe the effect that the product or service is suppose to produce 
after it is used.”255 
Beginning with the first branch, the laudatory terms discussed 
above do not describe a quality of the product.  A quality of a 
product is an attribute of a product that someone can pin down or 
recognize and declare unequivocally, “this apple is green” or “this 
tomato sauce is thick.”  Ah, you say, but who is to judge whether 
the sauce (Sauce X) is thick or not.  Perhaps mom made the thick-
est sauce around and even though sauce X is probably the thickest 
on the market, mother’s loving children believe it is not up to 
snuff.  This is a good point—but an irrelevant one for the argu-
ment.  It is clear that thickness can be judged on a scale, a make-
believe “thickometer,” or even by a simple comparison with the 
help of a strainer.  The thickness measurement, in comparison to 
terms such as “Blue Ribbon”—assuming that no prize was ever 
won, “Imperial,” and “Supreme,” is precise.  These latter three 
terms do not describe an attribute or a quality of a product, and 
hence, would be next to impossible to measure. 
Also, the laudatory terms listed in the preceding paragraph do 
 
250. 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1984); see also CALLMANN, supra note 211, §§ 18.04, 
18.05 (discussing the 20th Century Wear Inc. precedent). 
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not describe an ingredient of a product.  In the sauce example, to-
mato would be descriptive of an ingredient in the sauce—no to-
mato, no sauce.  Hence, labeling the sauce tomato-like would be 
descriptive of the sauce under anyone’s definition.  Attempting to 
say that imperialness or supremacy is an ingredient of the sauce 
would be nonsensical. 
Next, the effects of the product cannot be described by the 
laudatory terms discussed earlier.  An effect of a product can be 
explained by an aspirin which will affect the body’s blood flow 
and hopefully, the headache.  If the tomato sauce is very spicy, it 
will make one’s mouth burn.  If a product is “supreme” it will not 
have a predictable effect.  It is not possible for a product to “su-
preme” my mouth or “imperialize” me.  Hence, laudatory terms, 
do not indicate effects in “natural and ordinary language”.  It is 
necessary then, to analyze the second branch of the operative defi-
nition. 
The last part of the first branch of Callmann’s definition men-
tions “other features.”  Because Callmann introduces the first 
branch of his definition with the word “literal,” it appears clear that 
these “other features” are meant to be interpreted as attributes that 
can be seen or measured in some way.  A literal feature of Sauce X 
might be its thickness or color.  It most definitely would not be its 
imperialness or its supremacy.  Therefore, laudatory terms, repre-
sented by the few noted above, do not meet the first branch of 
Callmann’s “descriptive” definition because they do not describe 
qualities, ingredients, effects, or other features of a product in natu-
ral and ordinary language.256 
The second branch of Callmann’s definition of descriptiveness 
can be disposed of as well.  The first of the three subcategories un-
der this strand of the definition are “marks that describe a problem 
or condition that the trademarked product is designed to rem-
edy.”257  A mark such as “Headache-Gone” or “So-Long Bad 
Breath” might satisfy this requirement.  It is clear, for instance, that 
“Super Iron,” “Plus,” and “America’s Best” do not describe a prob-
lem that the good or service can cure.  The second part of this 
 
256. See CALLMANN, supra note 212, § 18.05. 
257. Id. 
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strand of the definition of descriptiveness relates to the uses to 
which the product can be put.  “Super Iron,” “Plus,” and “Amer-
ica’s Best” do not meet this requirement.  None of these terms, by 
itself, describe how a product can be used to satisfy a need.  All 
three terms are too general and vague to be pinned down in this 
fashion. 
The last hurdle set up by Callmann’s definition is his statement 
that “marks that describe the effect that the product or service is 
suppose[d] to produce” are “descriptive.”258  Could someone feel 
more “Plus” today than he or she did yesterday?  It would be 
highly unlikely.  In addition, it is a virtual certainty that someone 
could not possibly feel more “Imperial” or “Supreme” as a factual 
matter.  Perhaps, after eating the top quality sauce, one will feel 
like he or she is part of the “in” crowd, but this emotion is not aptly 
stated in the laudatory terms I have mentioned above.  Once, again, 
these terms are too vague to be applied in this manner.  By utiliz-
ing a very broad definition of “descriptive” and showing that 
laudatory terms do not fall within its reach, the concept of sugges-
tiveness must be examined to see if these terms fit nicely into its 
arms. 
B. Laudatory Terms Generally Suggest the Desired Attributes 
of the Products they are Associated With 
A term is suggestive if it necessitates imagination, thought and 
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.259  
Scrutinizing terms such as “Gold Medal”, “Imperial”, “Plus,” “Su-
per”, “Select,” “Deluxe,” “Greatest Show” and “100%”, what 
comes to mind is a bit unclear . . . but that is exactly the point.  It 
takes a little thought to figure out what these terms imply.  Perhaps 
“Plus” implies that the product has more of some ingredient or that 
the product is of a higher quality than the average product.  Each 
idea is possible yet neither idea is a sure bet.260  “Select” seems to 
 
258. Id. 
259. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 
1976) (quoting Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 
488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 87 
(2d Cir. 1984); LONG, supra note 49, at 49. 
260. See Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1509. 
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imply high quality.  Rightfully, this is what most people would 
think when they see “Select” as a mark.  What kind of high quality 
is a different story.  What is good for the goose may not be good 
for the gander.  Again, it is the perception of the consumer that is 
all important.  To one consumer, “Deluxe” may be interpreted as 
“this product” contains more ingredients than other such products.  
To another consumer, “Deluxe” may be associated with higher 
quality ingredients or service.  One consumer may associate 
“100%” with powerful ingredients or effects while another may in-
terpret the same term to mean a certain purity level exists.  With a 
suggestive term, as opposed to a descriptive term, the producer of 
the product is allowing more freedom for the consumer to perceive 
the product in her own way.  With a descriptive term, the product 
name is more likely to tell the potential customer what the product 
is all about, therefore, leave the customer with little to imagine. 
Laudatory terms, says professor McCarthy, are meant to imply 
high quality and to impart an intangible expectation about the 
product.261  This explanation seems to point in the “suggestive” di-
rection.  However, professor McCarthy then states that “[s]elf-
laudatory or ‘puffing’ marks are regarded as a condensed form of 
describing the character or quality of the goods and that they can 
describe some intangible facet of a product.”262  It is posited that 
professor McCarthy’s view that a laudatory term can describe 
some intangible facet of a product is misplaced.  It is put forth that 
laudatory terms can only suggest these aspects of goods or ser-
vices.  McCarthy’s definition appears to be at odds with 
Callmann’s definition because Callmann’s “qualities” need to be 
indicated in “natural and ordinary language” so that the consumer 
can understand the significance of the mark.263  Once the qualities 
of a product have been condensed into a vague laudatory term to 
describe them, some amount of imagination is required on the part 
of the consumer to decipher the appropriate, if there is one, mean-
ing of the term.  If this task is done correctly, it is somewhat time 
consuming and often inaccurate.  Callmann’s definition seems to 
 
261. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17. 
262. Id.; see also Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 127 F.2d 
318 (C.C.P.A. 1942). 
263. See CALLMANN, supra note 212, § 18.05. 
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imply that qualities are tangible in his analysis and this is why they 
can be explained by simple language.264  Because it is championed 
that laudatory terms cannot properly describe a product or describe 
an “intangible facet” of a product, McCarthy’s definition appears 
flawed, and for that reason, it is believed that Callmann’s defini-
tion is more accurate and broader than McCarthy’s. 
Furthermore, I have yet to see a definition of “suggestive” that 
states a substantial amount of imagination is required on the part 
of the consumer.265  Only some imagination appears necessary—a 
low threshold to surmount.  A definition of  “suggest” will 
strengthen the argument: to bring before a person’s mind indirectly 
or to call something up in the mind through association or natural 
connection of ideas.266  This definition does an admirable job of 
capturing what laudatory terms are designed to do.  These terms 
are vague terms that try to aid or perhaps confuse the consumer in 
thinking about a product a certain way.  The maker of “Copper-
tone” tanning products clearly wished to convey the idea that the 
product will help yield the skin a healthy glow.  The manufacturer 
of “Kickers” is well are that this term will conjure up images of 
shoes.  If one owns an “Accuride” drawer slide mechanism, one 
should expect that the product will perform the same way each 
time it travels along its path. 
C. The Laudatory Term Case-Law Has Been Inconsistent 
Many of the cases mentioned throughout this paper can be cri-
tiqued because they have often mischaracterized the laudatory 
marks as being descriptive.  The first case mentioned in Part II, 
Beadleston,267 contained a clear analysis of the purposes of trade-
mark law,268  However, the court erroneously stated that “Impe-
 
264. See id. 
265. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc, 108 F.3d 1503, 1509 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Gruner + Jahr USA Publ’g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1076 (2d Cir. 1993). 
266. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1314 (rev. ed. 1984). 
267. Beadleston & Woerz v. Cooke Brewing Co., 74 F. 229 (7th Cir. 1896). 
268. See id. at 230-231.  The court discussed consumer confusion, good faith on the 
part of the defendant, and trademarks as tools that set one producer’s goods apart from 
those of others. Id. 
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rial” was descriptive of the beer.269  The court fell into this trap be-
cause the plaintiff manufactured beers of different qualities.  None-
theless, the fact the plaintiff manufactured different grades of 
beers, does not add very much to the descriptive quality of the beer 
that was put in this particular can.  “Imperial”, it is admitted, can 
suggest the relative quality of the beer compared to other beers—
this is a matter of taste of course, but the plaintiff is not registering 
the trademarks for three of its beers at the same time.  Though the 
context of a term is studied when deciding registration, it is doubt-
ful that any comparison between beers is taken into account when 
determining the registerability of the term.  There may be perqui-
sites associated with a Seventh Circuit Judge position but taste 
tests probably are not among them.  Consequently, “Imperial” says 
very little about the qualities of the beer.  Likewise, the Hiram 
Walker court used the term “descriptive” when discussing “Impe-
rial”.270  By stating that “Imperial” meant high quality, the court 
reasoned how the proponent of the mark wished the purchasing 
public to reason.  However, until “imperialness” can be measured, 
the phrase is vague and merely suggestive.  As previously stated, 
“Imperial” describes nothing, it only implies high quality. 
Next, when the Board analyzed “America’s Favorite Popcorn” 
and “America’s Best Popcorn”, it stated the terms were laudatory 
and descriptive of the popcorn, which made the phrase informa-
tional.271  This last statement is incorrect in all but the laudatory 
label.  The Board was, though, accurate in determining that, be-
cause no secondary meaning existed with respect to the popcorn 
product, refusal of registration was proper.272  Ironically, if it was 
possible to determine whether this was America’s favorite pop-
corn, and if that were answered in the affirmative, then perhaps the 
term would be descriptive and not entitled to registration—a pen-
alty for making a superior snack item. 
Furthermore, “Smackin’ Good” is not descriptive, but rather 
suggestive.  The Board was incorrect in labeling the term descrip-
 
269. See id. at 231. 
270. See Hiram Walker, 79 F.2d at 837-38. 
271. See In re Wileswood, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 400, 404 (T.T.A.B. 1978).  Because, 
the popcorn was sold only in a few stores, the phrase seems ridiculous. 
272. See id. at 404. 
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tive in In re National Tea Co.273  Obviously, no one gets smacked 
when tasting the tea.  Perhaps the tea has a crisp taste, not unlike a 
crisp smack across the face, if such a comparison can be made.  In 
addition, the “goodness” of the product is advertised even though 
this characteristic, if it is one, is not measurable.  Likewise, “Se-
lecta” is suggestive and not descriptive, but the Board incorrectly 
determined that the term was descriptive.274  “Select” may imply 
that the product or its ingredients are chosen from a plethora of 
choices.  It may also imply that the product is relatively better than 
other products on the market, whether from other producers or 
even the producer of the “Select” brand. 
The In re Occidental Petroleum Board was correct in stating 
that “Super Iron” was suggestive of a large quantity of iron, but 
was remiss in not analyzing the secondary meaning issue.275  After 
correctly, but quickly, deciding the descriptive/suggestive issue, 
the Board apparently found it easy to conclude that the mark was 
worthy of protection—simply because the phrase was suggestive.  
Perhaps the Board decided too easily that registration was proper.  
Labeling “Super” suggestive was also the proper way to proceed in 
determining whether or not to allow registration for the term “Su-
per Slush”.276  However, as in Occidental Petroleum, the Board 
quickly decided that registration was appropriate and was careless 
in omitting a discussion of secondary meaning. 
With the Platinum Home Mortgage decision, it is apparent that 
the court erred in labeling “Platinum” descriptive of the plaintiff’s 
services.  According to the liberal definition of “descriptive” given 
above, this term clearly does not fall within its realm.  On the con-
trary, the term suggests excellence or high quality, or some other 
special feature that the vendor possesses.  Thus the court erred 
when it noted that this term could be “truthfully applied to a whole 
range of goods and services.”277  There is nothing truthful about 
this term as it relates to mortgages.  Platinum and mortgages have 
 
273. 166 U.S.P.Q. 288 (T.T.A.B. 1970). 
274. See In re San Miguel Corporation, 229 U.S.P.Q. 617 (T.T.A.B. 1986). 
275. See In re Occidental Petroleum, 167 U.S.P.Q. 128 (T.T.A.B. 1970). 
276. See In re Ralston Purina, 191 U.S.P.Q. 237, 238 (T.T.A.B. 1976). 
277. See Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 97 C 
5293, 1997 WL 567909, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 1997), aff’d 149 F.3d 722. 
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nothing to do with each other.  Loosely using terminology such as 
“truthful,” is dangerous for a court’s thinking because it confuses 
what should be suggestive terms with descriptive ones, with the re-
sulting change in analysis.  Having said this, the term Platinum is a 
not a poor choice for the name of a business because it seems just 
as arbitrary or suggestive as it does descriptive.  It therefore should 
have been protected from another firm in the same business using 
the same name because customer confusion would likely result.  
The user of the name “Platinum” should not expect this name to be 
protected against firms using the name outside the mortgage indus-
try because customer confusion would be unlikely. 
Fortunately, some courts have understood the dilemma when 
analyzing laudatory terms.278  Both the Pabst Brewing and France 
Milling cases seem to be close to the championed theory in their 
analysis’.  Both cases implied that the marks at issue, “Blue Rib-
bon” and “Gold Medal” respectively, were indicative or suggestive 
of quality and only worthy of protection if consumers would be 
confused as to the source of the product.279  Neither court claimed 
that the term at issue was descriptive.280  This is accurate because 
the two terms suggest high quality and nothing more.  The plaintiff 
in Pabst, never earned a blue ribbon as far as we can tell, and the 
plaintiff in France Milling, though garnering a Gold Medal during 
the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis in 1904, could not 
claim that its pancake and buckwheat possessed some “gold-
medal” quality; it could only claim through the term that its flour 
was liked by many, and perhaps, enjoyed more than other flour 
produced by its competition. 
Similarly, when the Hughes court held the term “Ideal” was not 
descriptive,281 it was correct in its analysis.  In addition, the court 
then noted that there was secondary meaning associated with the 
term “Ideal”—a “descriptive” analysis.282  Rightly, the court real-
ized that because “Ideal” described no aspect of the hairbrush the 
 
278. See supra Part II. 
279. See Pabst Brewing Co. v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 F. 110, 112-13 (7th Cir. 
1922); France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1925). 
280. See Pabst, 284 F. at 112-13; France Milling 7 F.2d at 306. 
281. See Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co., 209 F. 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1913). 
282. See id. at 38-39. 
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term was commonplace enough to be utilized by others.283  Unless 
“Ideal” was so ingrained in consumers’ minds, it was not worthy of 
protection, despite its “suggestive” nature.284 
Likewise, the Duvernoy court mentioned that the term “Consis-
tently Superior” was laudatory but did not mention whether it was 
descriptive or suggestive.285  The court however, looked for evi-
dence of a secondary meaning because the mark was weak.286  This 
was the correct approach because, again, trademark law should not 
give firms an incentive to use weak marks for products that the 
firms wish protected.  By not mentioning the “suggestive” or “de-
scriptive” sections of the trademark spectrum, the court avoided 
blatantly linking suggestive terms with a secondary meaning 
analysis, an analysis that would seem misguided because tradition-
ally, only descriptive terms are put to the secondary meaning hur-
dle.  This judicial strategy is crafty, even if unintentional.  Yet, the 
analysis in this case was smart and effective because it provided no 
incentive for the firm to use a vague self-laudatory name.  Simi-
larly, the court’s analysis in Supreme Wine is worthy of respect be-
cause the court first noted that the term “Supreme” was to call at-
tention to the superiority of the product and then stated that to 
protect this weak mark, secondary meaning was necessary.287  
Once more, the court, perhaps wisely, avoided the use of “sugges-
tive” and “descriptive” and focused instead upon the inherent 
weakness of the mark in separating the goods of the plaintiff from 
the goods of others.288  Furthermore, on point was the Board’s 
analysis of the term “The Premium Grade Malathion” in In re 
American Cynamid Co.289  The Board stated that the phrase was 
“laudatory, if not, a descriptive designation” and capable of acquir-
ing secondary meaning.290  The Board seemed to realize that lauda-
tory terms are not descriptive of the product they are paired up 
 
283. See id. at 39. 
284. See id. 
285. See Duvernoy, 212 F.2d at 204. 
286. Id. 
287. See Supreme Wine Co. v. American Distilling Co., 310 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir. 
1962). 
288. See id. 
289. 176 U.S.P.Q. 350 (T.T.A.B. 1973). 
290. See id. at 351. 
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with.  “Premium Grade” is not a technical term in the industry and 
therefore, the phrase is suggestive of high quality. Another exam-
ple of a wise approach to the problem is the Valmor case.291  The 
First Circuit stated correctly that “Valmor” was suggestive of the 
skin care products of the complainant.292  Immediately after find-
ing the term to be suggestive, the court elaborated “[m]ore impor-
tantly, though, even if under some circumstances self-laudatory 
trademarks should not be registered or protected . . . the district 
court here found that . . . advertising over forty-five years has . . . 
established a close connection between the trademark name and its 
products . . . .”293  Wisely, the court did not dwell on the word, 
whether suggestive or descriptive, linked to the product, but real-
ized the term was vague, looked for secondary meaning, analyzed 
customer confusion, and concluded that the plaintiff’s rights in the 
name were being infringed.294  More likely than not, this case 
posed less of a dilemma because the plaintiff’s company was in-
corporated under the name “Valmor”, and the term at issue was a 
somewhat inventive combination of two suggestive terms, “value” 
and “more.” 
In discussing combination terms, it should be noted that the 
combination term in Plus Products295 must have greatly challenged 
the Board, because its reasoning was intensely convoluted.  By 
correctly stating that “Plus” was suggestive and then re-analyzing 
the term after the addition of “pH”, the Board was using an addi-
tional term, “pH”, to help distinguish “pH Plus” from “Plus,” the 
marks of the proponent and opposer respectively.  First, it seems 
odd that the court assumed “pH” was “obviously descriptive” 
when one can disagree.  The term “pH” is a measure of acidity, but 
it is not a specific measurement and describes nothing.  The term 
suggests some sort of chemical compound but nothing more.  The 
health care products at issue have an acidity, but so does ice cream, 
so letting consumers know that the product has an acidity discloses 
little.  The term “pH” seems to suggest that the product manufac-
 
291. See Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1972). 
292. See id. at 201-02. 
293. Id. at 202. 
294. See id. 
295. Plus Prods. v. Redken Labs, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 111 (T.T.A.B. 1978). 
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turer is concerned about the acidity and a certain level of acidity is 
more desirable than other levels, but this all falls under the sugges-
tive umbrella.296  Second, the Board appeared to err by using a 
likelihood of confusion analysis rather than a secondary meaning 
examination to conclude that “pH Plus” was not primarily descrip-
tive of the applicant’s products.297  Of course, a likelihood of con-
fusion analysis would be appropriate in deciding whether or not to 
protect the mark, but generally, likelihood of confusion is not 
mixed in with a discussion of whether the mark is primarily de-
scriptive of a product.  The Board did not use a secondary meaning 
analysis because it concluded “Plus” was suggestive of ingredients 
in the products.  However, by labeling the term suggestive and re-
lying on advertising levels, the Board appeared to follow the path 
recommended below, and arrived at a satisfactory conclusion.298  If 
this seems confusing, it is because it is confusing. 
Returning to Estee Lauder,299 the Second Circuit was correct in 
concluding “100%” was suggestive.  Interestingly, the court pro-
nounced that laudatory terms were generally deemed suggestive.300  
Though we have seen other cases have agree with this proposition, 
it is contrary to McCarthy’s position that laudatory terms, on the 
whole are descriptive.301  The court’s position seems to be the cor-
rect one.  However, before the praise for the court goes unabated, 
the Estee Lauder court held that “100%” was protectable simply 
because it was a suggestive term.302  This is the long-standing no-
tion, but one which this section of the Note preaches against.  
Here, it is urged that empty terms such as “100%”, when “100%” 
is used vaguely, despite being suggestive, should require secondary 
meaning before being protected.  The reasons why will be dis-
cussed below. 
 
296. Applicant disclaimed “pH” as a measure of acidity or alkalinity.  See id. at 117. 
297. See id. at 117-18. 
298. It should be noted that the opposer could also use “pH” in describing its prod-
ucts if those products could be so described.  See id. at 118.  This appears curious because 
the Board, though stating “pH” is descriptive (which is doubted here), was vague when 
explaining how this term could describe any product. 
299. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc, 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997). 
300. See id. at 1509. 
301. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17. 
302. See id. at 1510. 
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D. For the Treatment of Laudatory Terms to Match the Goals 
of Trademark Law, A Slightly Different Analysis is 
Required 
A pattern seems to have developed among some of the cases 
discussed.  Those courts that eschewed the descriptive/suggestive 
dichotomy, such as Duvernoy and Supreme Wine, relied on a sec-
ondary meaning analysis.  The In re Occidental Petroleum deci-
sion, attempting to fit the term into the dichotomy, chose to label 
the term “Super Iron” suggestive, ignored the secondary meaning 
analysis, because, it is well understood that suggestive terms do not 
require secondary meaning to be registerable.  By ignoring the di-
chotomy, it appears that some courts are realizing that laudatory 
terms do not fit neatly into the current framework.  By not relying 
on the trademark spectrum, and instead using common sense, a 
path can be followed that often will lead to correct decisions being 
made in the laudatory term framework.  This is not to imply that 
the trademark spectrum is outdated or of no use in deciding when 
words and phrases are protectible.  For the great many cases, the 
spectrum is adequate for this purpose.  Nevertheless, for words and 
phrases that are clearly laudatory, such as “Plus” and “Super”, the 
spectrum seems deficient because a strict following of the dichot-
omy will more likely lead to the granting of protection, because the 
word is, if one is intellectually honest, suggestive, and no secon-
dary meaning analysis is undertaken.  Protection would be more 
persuasive if the term was more creative—perhaps a clearly fanci-
ful or arbitrary term or certainly even a clearly non-laudatory sug-
gestive term, and there are many that exist.  The ingenuity would 
be sufficient enough to persuade this author that the term is worthy 
of protection against those to attempt to dilute its effectiveness by 
utilizing the same or a similar term. 
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that this ar-
gument champions the position that before these lauda-
tory/suggestive terms are worthy of protection, secondary meaning 
should be found to exist—a high hurdle to leap.  Counsel to com-
panies will be abetted in their quest to have their clients use more 
arbitrary and fanciful terms if a substantial hurdle, lack of trade-
mark protection, is put in the way by the courts.  Realizing that it is 
SOSINSKY.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:36 PM 
1999] LAUDATORY TERMS IN TRADEMARK LAW 771 
not the goal of trademark law to influence firms in naming their 
products, this argument does take the position that it is right to re-
ward firms for using a mark that will gain protection and erroneous 
to reward firms that intend to use weak and vague marks to label 
their goods and services.  Laudatory terms are not necessary for 
firms to sell products.  Those firms that would be dissatisfied with 
the ideas presented herein can still use truly descriptive terms to 
name their wares.  Nonetheless, it is smart law to require some 
showing that consumers link the laudatory term with a product be-
fore the word or phrase can be protected.  Without this require-
ment, companies can use cryptic laudatory terms and leave the 
consumer guessing what is meant by “Super” or “Plus” and be re-
warded by having these terms protected.  Because these terms can-
not be defined, a product can have less iron than all of its competi-
tors’ products yet be labeled “Super Iron.” 
An arbitrary name will not give the consumer more informa-
tion about a product than a laudatory term, but it is less likely to be 
misleading because arbitrary or fanciful terms, on the whole, do 
not “brag”.  Also, firms competing with the company using the 
laudatory name may have a better product than the “laudatory” 
firm, yet if the firm with the inferior product can easily protect its 
mark, it will be encouraged to use the laudatory term on its goods 
or services, and possibly mislead consumers.  Again, protection of 
consumers is arguably the pivotal goal of trademark law and this 
argument should further that goal in a small way.  Trademark law 
does not wish to reward companies for misidentifying their goods 
or using chicanery in any way.303 
Though the Lanham Act has been amended often in the past, 
the most recent major amendments coming in the form of the 
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,304 alterations to the Lanham 
Act would not fix the issue herein.  The Act does not talk of the 
distinctiveness spectrum and yet the courts, on the whole, do an 
admirable job with trademark law issues.  Certainly, laudatory 
terms cause many problems for the system, but attempting to spell 
 
303. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052. 
304. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1994)).  The Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act of 1995 contained relatively few changes. See id. 
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out what laudatory terms are and the distinctions among them, 
would only befuddle the problem.  The beauty of the Lanham Act 
is the flexibility it gives those that wish to use a trademark to dis-
tinguish their products.305  As a matter of fact, the only section of 
the Act which hits on our issue is section 1052(e), which states that 
terms which are merely descriptive are not registerable.306  There-
fore, it is plain that the Act takes a somewhat laissez-faire ap-
proach in its view on trademarks, and service marks, and any tink-
ering with this policy should be done carefully and sparingly.  
There is no need to go that route here. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lanham Act does not define what a laudatory term is or 
how it should be protected.  Yet, many businesses prefer to use 
these terms because they tend to signal to consumers that the prod-
uct or service is of good quality and perhaps, better quality than the 
products it competes with.  Because the Lanham Act does not men-
tion laudatory terms, and even if it did, it could not do so ade-
quately because the term is so elusive, the judiciary has been all 
over the map.  The courts that have realized that laudatory terms 
do not specifically describe anything about the product, but rather 
 
305. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052 states: 
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from 
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on ac-
count of its nature unless it— 
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or mat-
ter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons living or 
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or 
disrepute; 
. . .  
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in 
the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in 
the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used in 
connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive . . . 
(e) Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods 
of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, (2) 
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geo-
graphically descriptive of them. 
Id. 
306. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e). 
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suggest some quality about the product, are the courts that are on 
the right track.  In addition, the requirement that a laudatory term 
should have a secondary meaning associated with it before it can 
be protected under the Lanham Act should encourage firms to use 
these terms sparingly.  By limiting the use of these terms and en-
couraging ones that are closer to arbitrary on the distinctiveness 
spectrum, the courts can champion the general goals of trademark 
law: (1) to protect firms that have spent capital developing trade-
marks from the free-riding of other firms off of this effort, and (2) 
to protect consumers from purchasing a good or service that is not 
what was expected.  Laudatory terms do not fit very neatly into the 
current trademark framework, but with care, common sense, and a 
desire to fulfill the goals of the Lanham Act, they can be ade-
quately dealt with by the judicial system. 
